Difference between revisions of "Is Shea asking the right question?"

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Again, this deserves a longer discussion. But, briefly, I wonder whether the conversation has been hijacked and turned into something that is not that interesting. We want to focus on the interesting question (what is special about the activity of certain neurons when they are involved in perception, in seeing something, in representing something out in the world?). Much of the discussion is about categorising things that count as representations which is, after all, the title of the book. 'In' are things like maps and a thermometer and a machine that crawls towards a power source. 'Out' is a miraculous copy of a macaque monkey who can behave like a normal one. But these examples must be drifting away from the interesting question (for which the swamp monkey is 'in' and the simple machines are 'out').
 
Again, this deserves a longer discussion. But, briefly, I wonder whether the conversation has been hijacked and turned into something that is not that interesting. We want to focus on the interesting question (what is special about the activity of certain neurons when they are involved in perception, in seeing something, in representing something out in the world?). Much of the discussion is about categorising things that count as representations which is, after all, the title of the book. 'In' are things like maps and a thermometer and a machine that crawls towards a power source. 'Out' is a miraculous copy of a macaque monkey who can behave like a normal one. But these examples must be drifting away from the interesting question (for which the swamp monkey is 'in' and the simple machines are 'out').
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* [[talk:Is Shea asking the right question?|Comment from Nick]]
  
 
Back to [[Seminars on Shea book|notes on Shea (2018)]].
 
Back to [[Seminars on Shea book|notes on Shea (2018)]].

Latest revision as of 22:03, 7 July 2020

Again, this deserves a longer discussion. But, briefly, I wonder whether the conversation has been hijacked and turned into something that is not that interesting. We want to focus on the interesting question (what is special about the activity of certain neurons when they are involved in perception, in seeing something, in representing something out in the world?). Much of the discussion is about categorising things that count as representations which is, after all, the title of the book. 'In' are things like maps and a thermometer and a machine that crawls towards a power source. 'Out' is a miraculous copy of a macaque monkey who can behave like a normal one. But these examples must be drifting away from the interesting question (for which the swamp monkey is 'in' and the simple machines are 'out').

Back to notes on Shea (2018).